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Abstract
We ﬁnd that reduced foreign corporate taxes may lead to ineﬃcient foreign
acquisitions if complementarities between foreign and domestic assets are low, and to
eﬃcient foreign acquisitions if such complementarities are high. Moreover, with large
complementarities, foreign acquisitions can increase domestic tax revenues. The
reason is that in the bidding competition between the foreign ﬁrms, all beneﬁts from
the acquisition, including tax advantages and evaded taxes, are competed away and
captured by the domestic seller which, in turn, pays capital gains tax on the proceeds.
Technical issues in the tax code, such as the treatment of goodwill deductibility, is
also shown to crucially aﬀect the pattern of foreign acquisitions.
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In the ongoing globalization process there is a concern among high tax countries that
ineﬃcient foreign owners with tax advantages will acquire domestic ﬁrms despite running
them less eﬃciently.1 There is also a concern that foreign acquistions will lead to increased
tax evasion and thereby to reduced domestic tax revenues.2
To address these issues, we develop an oligopoly model where inward FDI can take
place both through foreign acquisitions and new investments, so-called greenﬁeld entry.
Acquired assets are in scarce supply and the acquisition price is determined in an auction
acquisition game. Moreover, there is a complementarity between foreign and domestic
assets that determines how eﬃciently a foreign owner will use the domestic assets. Inputs
for greenﬁeld entry are non-scarce and their (variable) price is constant. A domestic owner
who keeps the domestic assets pays a proﬁtt a xo nt h ep r o ﬁts and a capital gains tax on
the remaining proceeds. If the domestic owner sells the assets, she/he pays a capital gains
tax on the sales price. A foreign owner pays the domestic proﬁt tax in the host country on
the proﬁts, unless transfer pricing is used in order to pay proﬁt tax in the foreign country,
and pays a capital gains tax in the foreign country.3
We start by establishing that in equilibrium both eﬃcient and ineﬃcient acquisitions
may occur, where eﬃcient acquisitions are mainly driven by the exploitation of high com-
plemetarities between foreign and domestic assets, while ineﬃcient acquisitions are mainly
driven by the desire to eliminate a local rival. We then turn to the eﬀect of reduced foreign
corporate taxes on the equilibrium acquisition pattern.
First, we show that reduced foreign capital gains taxes will trigger foreign acquistions
when goodwill associated with an acquisition is not deductible. The reason is that reduced
1 See for instance the discussion in Henrekson and Jakobsson (2003).
2 See for instance the discussion in World Investment Report (WIR) 1998.
3 In many countries, such as the United States and many European countries, income from
equity-ﬁnanced corporate investment is taxed twice: at the corporate level, a tax is levied on net
proﬁts and at the shareholder level, dividends and realized capital gains on shares are subject to
personal income tax. See Sørensen (1995).
2foreign capital gains taxes then increase the foreign owners’ willingness to pay for domestic
assets. To see this note that a foreign ﬁrm’s willingness to pay for the domestic assets is
then the product market proﬁt for the acquired ﬁrm minus the proﬁtt h ef o r e i g no w n e r
would generate if it instead entered greenﬁeld, net of domestic proﬁt taxes and foreign
capital gains taxes. A reduction in foreign capital gains taxes will then increase the foreign
owner’s willingness to pay and thereby increase the incentive for both eﬃciency enhancing
and eﬃciency reducing foreign acquisitions. However, we also show that when goodwill is
deductible foreign capital taxes will not aﬀect the incentives for foreign acquisitions, since
all costs associated with the acquisition are then deductible at the capital gain level.
Second, we show that reduced foreign proﬁt taxes will trigger foreign acquistions when a
foreign owner can use transfer pricing to transfer all proﬁts to a foreign country with lower
proﬁtt a x . 4 Af o r e i g nﬁrm’s willingness to pay for the domestic assets is now the product
market proﬁtf o rt h ea c q u i r e dﬁrm minus the proﬁt the foreign owner would generate if
it instead entered greenﬁeld, net of foreign proﬁtt a x e sand foreign capital gains taxes.
It then follows directly that foreign ﬁrms willingness to pay increases when foreign proﬁt
taxes are reduced.5
N e x t ,w et u r nt ot h ei s s u eo fh o wF D Ia ﬀects domestic tax revenues. We then ﬁrst
establish that there is a fundamental diﬀerence between foreign direct entry investment in
scarce and non-scarce assets as concerns the eﬀects on tax revenues. When a foreign ﬁrm
undertakes greenﬁeld entry, it will pay a ﬁxed entry cost only covering the opportunity
cost in terms of factor inputs. No additional domestic capital gains are created, which
is in contrast to acquisition entry, where an increase in taxable capital gains occurs due
4 See Caves (1996) and the references therein for theoretical contributions to the literature
on transfer pricing. Bartelsman and Beetsma (2000) ﬁnd evidence of tax diﬀerences having a
signiﬁcant impact on where incomes are declared. See also references in World Investment Report
(WIR) 1998.
5 Indeed, the result that relatively low foreign tax rates can increase the attractiveness of
domestic ﬁrms as targets for foreign merger activity is in line with some of the empirical ﬁndings
in the literature. Auerbach and Hassett (1993), for example, ﬁnd that FDI in the form of M&A
increased as a response to an increase in US corporate taxes.
3to the foreign takeover. To see this note that if the complementarity between foreign
and domestic assets are suﬃciently large, a surplus is created when the domestic assets
are transferred to a foreign owner. However, due to the bidding competition between the
foreign owners for buying these assets, the surplus is captured by the target ﬁrm, i.e. the
domestic ﬁrm.
In particular, we demonstrate that a foreign acquisition can lead to increased domestic
tax revenues, even if the foreign owner fully evades all taxes, since all beneﬁts from the
acquisition — including the value of tax evasion — are captured by the domestic sellers.6
The sellers end up paying more taxes, since the capital gain from selling is higher than
the proﬁt from keeping the assets.7
That the tax revenues generated by foreign acquisitions might be substantial is illus-
trated by the acquisition of the Swedish car producer Volvo by FORD in 1999. The stock
p r i c er e a c t i o n st ot h ea c q u i s i t i o np r o c e s sa r es h o w ni nF i g u r e1 . 1 .F r o mt h et i m et h a tt h e
ﬁrst serious rumor emerged on December 18 1998 (Dagens Industri, December 22 1998)
to the date when the acquisition was announced, January 28 1999, Volvo’s stock market
value increased by 21% more than the general index (SIXRX). Since 56% of the stocks
in Volvo were owned by Swedes (Sundin and Sundqvist, 1998), future Swedish expected
capital gains tax revenues were increased by 210 million Euro, which amounts to about
ten percent of total net taxes on capital income in 1999. The motivation for this takeover
premium is likely to be due to both synergies and tax savings. In December 2002, Volvo
Cars (formerly Personvagnar), now an aﬃliate of FORD, was ruled to pay an additional
tax of 196 million Euro, since the claimed deduction of royalties to the mother company
FORD was denied by the local tax oﬃce (Dagens Industri, December 11 2002). Even if
6 By now, it is a well established fact that most beneﬁts from a takeover accrue to the owners
of the target ﬁrm (Andrade et al., 2001). Regarding cross-border M&As, it has been shown
that there is a takeover premium in cross-border M&As and that this premium diﬀers between
industries. See, for instance, Cebenoyan et al (1992), Dewenter (1995) and Harris and Ravenscraft
(1991).
7 Kant (1990) shows that transfer pricing can increase an MNE’s global tax payment in a
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Figure 1.1: The stock price reactions to the acquisition of the Swedish car producer Volvo
by FORD.
5these ﬁgures are just an indication, they suggest that the gains from “transfer pricing”
were expected from the deal and therefore, at least to some extent, incorporated in the
acquisition price.8
The related theoretical literature on FDI and taxes is surveyed in Navaretti and Ven-
ables (2004). However, this literature does not explicitly address the tax eﬀects of the
diﬀerent entry modes: greenﬁeld, acquisition of assets already in the market or both.9 We
add to this literature providing a model where foreign corporate taxes aﬀects the entry
mode. There is also a small theoretical literature addressing the welfare aspects of cross-
border M&As in international oligopoly markets.10 Our paper extends this literature by
allowing foreign acquisitions to aﬀect domestic tax revenues. The paper is also related to
the literature on tax competition and FDI.11 12 We add to this literature allowing domestic
asset prices to be aﬀected by the foreign entry and foreign taxes. The features of the model
developed should make it useful for analyzing issues where the focus is on the interplay
between M&A, ﬁrm investments and diﬀerent types of corporate tax and subsidy policies.
The model is spelled out and solved in Section 2. Section 3, studies how foreign taxes
aﬀect the equilibrium ownership and ownership eﬃciency of the domestic assets. Section
8 Since proﬁt taxes are lower in Sweden than in the US, there are no direct proﬁtt a xb e n e ﬁts
from this transfer. However, the IRS are known to be aggressive when it comes to taxing foreign
proﬁts and hence, the transfer was of value to FORD.
9 See for instance,
Mattoo, Olarrega, and Saggi (2004) and Klimenko and Saggi (2005), and Norbäck and Persson
(2005a, 2005b) for papers addressing welfare aspects and the choice of entry mode. However,
none of these papers includes taxes.
10 This literature includes papers by, for example, Falvey (1998), Head and Reis (1997), Horn
and Persson (2001), Lommerud, Straume and Sorgard (2005), Neary (2003), and Saggi and Yildiz
(2005).
11 See Wildasin and Wilson (1991) for an overview of the public ﬁnance literature on this topic.
There is also an international trade literature on this topic; see, for instance, Fumagalli (2003)
and Hauﬂer and Wooton (1999).
12 There is a recent literature studying tax competition in environments where MNEs can use
transfer pricing. See, for instance, Hauﬂer and Schjelderup (2000) and Raimondos-Moller and
Scharf (2002). However, to our knowledge, no paper in that literature allows foreign entry to
aﬀect domestic asset prices.
64 examines the eﬀects of foreign taxes on domestic tax revenues. Section 5 concludes.
Finally, most proofs appear in the Appendix.
2. The Model
Consider a host country, H, where the market has previously been served by a single
domestic ﬁrm, denoted d, possessing one unit of domestic assets, denoted ¯ k.T h i sm a r k e t
will now be exposed to international competition by an investment liberalization. There
are M symmetric foreign ﬁrms in the world market, which do not initially have any assets
in Country H, but might now invest by an acquisition of ﬁrm d or through investing
greenﬁeld in new assets in Country H.
The interaction takes place in three stages. In stage 1, the foreign ﬁrms might acquire
the domestic ﬁrm’s assets. In stage 2, investment in new assets takes place in country H.
In stage 3, product market interaction takes place and ﬁr m sp a yt a x e so np r o d u c tm a r k e t
proﬁts net incurred costs.
2.1. Stage 3: product market interaction and tax payments
We will work with the following notation: Let the set of ﬁrms in the industry be i ∈ I,
where I = {d,1,2,..M} and the set of (potential) ownerships of the domestic assets, ¯ k,
be l ∈ L,w h e r eL = {d,1,2,..M}. The asset ownership structure K =( kd,k m1,...,kmM)
speciﬁes the asset ownership of each ﬁrm. The ﬁrst entry refers to ﬁrm d’s asset holdings,
the second to foreign ﬁrm 1’s assets holdings, etc.
In many countries, among them the United States and many European countries,
income from equity-ﬁnanced corporate investment is taxed twice: at the corporate level, a
tax, t,i sl e v i e do nn e tp r o ﬁts, and at the shareholder level, dividends and realized capital
gains are subject to a personal capital gains tax, τ.13 Our formalization of the tax system
corresponds to such a double taxation system.14 In order to capture the eﬀects of corporate
13 See Sørensen (1995).
14 For a discussion of the Swedish system, see Lodin et al. 2001.
7taxes on the FDI pattern in a simple way, we work with the following taxation set up: A
domestic owner keeping its assets ¯ k pays a proﬁtt a x ,th,o nt h en e tp r o ﬁts and a capital
gains tax, τh, on the remaining proceeds. If selling the assets ¯ k, the domestic owner pays a
capital gains tax, τh, on the sales price, S.Af o r e i g no w n e ro f¯ k and foreign ﬁrms entering
greenﬁeld pays the proﬁtt a x ,tr. If transfer pricing is possible, the proﬁtt a xi smin{th,t f).
A foreign owner is then assumed to be able to shift proﬁts to a location with lower proﬁt
tax without cost.15 If transfer pricing is not possible, the foreign ﬁrm pays the proﬁtt a x
th in the host country. A foreign owner always pays a capital gains tax, τf, in a foreign
country on the remaining proceeds.16
Let πi(x,κ,l) denote the pre-tax product market proﬁto fﬁrm i net of investment
costs for new assets, κi. x is the vector of actions taken by ﬁrms in the product market
interaction, κ is the vector of investments in new assets from stage 2, and l denotes the
ownership of the domestic assets from stage 1. The optimal behavior in the product market
interaction is given as follows. Given the investments in stage 2, κ, and the ownership
of the domestic assets given from stage 1, l, ﬁrm i chooses an action xi (a price or a
q u a n t i t y )t om a x i m i z ei t sn e tp r o d u c tm a r k e tp r o ﬁt net of taxes and deductions for inputs
and investment costs, denoted (1 − τr)(1− tr)πi(xi,x −i : κ,l) for r = h,f ,w h e r ex−i is
the set of actions taken by i’s rivals. We assume there to exist a unique Nash-Equilibrium,
x∗ (κ,l),d e ﬁned as:




−i : κ,l) ≥ (1 − τr)(1− tr)πi(xi,x
∗
−i : κ,l), ∀xi ∈ R
+. (2.1)
Since neither capital gains taxes τr nor proﬁtt a x e str aﬀect the ﬁrms’ optimal actions
x∗ in (2.1), we can deﬁne a reduced-form product market proﬁtf o raﬁrm i,t a k i n ga s
given the ownership l of the domestic assets ¯ k and the vector of new investments κ,a s
15 Costly transfer pricing will not qualitatively change the results. For an analysis where
transfer pricing is endogenous within a setting where MNEs compete in an oligopoly, see, for
instance, Nielsen et. al (2005).
16 Note that proﬁt taxes are assumed to be paid only where proﬁts are reported. See Davies
(2004) for an elaborate analysis on bilateral tax treaties.
8πi (κ,l) ≡ πi(x∗
i (κ,l),x ∗
−i (κ,l),κ,l). The reduced-form product market proﬁtn e to ft a x e s
is then simply (1 − τr)(1− tr)πi (κ,l).
2.2. Stage 2: Investment in new assets
In this stage, ﬁrm i invests in new assets κi, such as capacity or R&D, given the ownership
l of the domestic assets, ¯ k, determined by the acquisition game in stage one. These
investments are undertaken to maximize the reduced-form product market proﬁts net of
taxes and are assumed to be tax deductible. We assume there to exist a unique Nash-
Equilibrium, κ∗ (l),d e ﬁned as:














, ∀κi ∈ R
+. (2.2)
Once more, since capital gains and proﬁtt a x e sd on o ta ﬀect the ﬁrm’s optimal actions κ∗
deﬁn e di n( 2 . 1 ) ,t h i sa l l o w su st od e ﬁne πi(l) ≡ πi(κ∗ (l),l) ≡ πi(x∗(κ∗ (l)),κ∗ (l),l)) as
a reduced-form gross proﬁtf u n c t i o nf o rﬁrm i under ownership l, encompassing the ﬁrm’s
optimal actions in period three, x∗, and optimal investments in new assets in period two,
κ∗. The reduced-form product market proﬁt net of taxes is hence (1 − tc
r)(1− th)πi(l).
The assumption that the foreign ﬁrms are symmetric before the acquisition takes place
implies that we need only distinguish between domestic ownership (l = d)a n dforeign
(foreign ﬁrm) ownership (l = m).
Deﬁnition 1. Let γ(m)=γ>0 be a measure of the complementarity between the do-
mestic assets ¯ k and foreign ﬁrms’ ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets.
Deﬁnition 1 implies that the ”eﬀective size” of the domestic assets ¯ k under foreign
ownership is γ¯ k (i.e. γ(m)=γ>0 and γ(d) ≡ 1 ). Since foreign ﬁrms are typically
leading ﬁrms in their respective industries and possess ﬁrm-speciﬁck n o w l e d g ei nt e r m s
of technology or know-how of organization of production and marketing (see Markusen
(1995) and Caves (1995)), foreign ownership can result in a more eﬃcient use of the local
asset, ¯ k. This corresponds to a γ larger than one in the model. We then make use of the
following deﬁnition:
9Deﬁnition 2. An acquisition is eﬃcient, if the buying foreign owner employs the local
assets with a more eﬃcient production technology, i.e. γ>1. An acquisition is ineﬃcient
if γ<1.
To proceed, we need to keep track of two diﬀerent types of asset ownership structures.
When the domestic asset ¯ k is sold to an acquiring foreign ﬁrm (A), we have K(m)=
(0,γ¯ k + κ∗
A,κ ∗
G,...,κ∗
G). The acquiring foreign ﬁrm A holds assets γ¯ k + κ∗
A, while the
remaining M − 1 greenﬁeld entrants (G)h o l dκ∗
G. If ¯ k is not sold and all foreign ﬁrms
enter greenﬁeld, we have K(d)=( ¯ k + κ∗
d,κ ∗
G,...,κ∗
G), where the domestic ﬁrm (d)h o l d s
assets ¯ k + κ∗
d, and the M foreign ﬁrms hold assets κ∗
G.
A change in ownership of existing domestic assets ¯ k from domestic to foreign ownership











≡ 0, h = {d,G}.
Assumption 1 states that an increase in the complementarity parameter, γ,i n c r e a s e s
the acquirer’s proﬁt, whereas the proﬁt for a non-acquirer decreases. This assumption is
compatible with several diﬀerent investment and oligopoly models. One example is the
Linear Quadratic Cournot Model presented in the Appendix, where an increase in com-
plementarity has a direct eﬀe c to n( t h ea c q u i r i n gﬁrm’s) productivity, indirectly aﬀecting
ﬁrms’ optimal actions in the stage-three product market game (x∗),o ra ﬀecting these ac-
tions through ﬁrms’ investment in new assets in stage two (κ∗).17 Finally, for expositional
reasons, we restrict the size of the complementarities to γ ∈ [0,γmax),w h e r eγmax is deﬁned
from πG(m)|γ=γmax =0 .18
17 This is an extended version, by an acquisition stage, of the model presented by Neary (2002).
18 Endogenizing the number of greenﬁeld entrants is tedious but straighforward and will not
qualitatively aﬀect results.
102.3. Stage 1: The acquisition game
The acquisition process is depicted as an auction where the foreign ﬁrms simultaneously
post bids and the domestic ﬁrm then either accepts or rejects these bids. Each foreign
ﬁrm announces a bid, bi. Following the announcement of bids, the domestic ﬁrm is either
sold at the bid price or remains in the ownership of ﬁrm d. The acquisition is solved for
Nash equilibria in undominated pure strategies.
3. Ownership eﬃciency
We here examine the eﬀects of how reductions in foreign taxes aﬀect the likelihood of inef-
ﬁcient foreign acquisitions, i.e. acquisitions where γ ∈ (0,1) and the likelihood of eﬃcient
foreign acquisitions, i.e. acquisitions where γ ∈ (1,γmax). We will show that whether re-
ductions in foreign corporate taxes induce ineﬃcient/eﬃcient foreign acquisitions crucially
depends on the level of complementarity between foreign and domestic assets, how the de-
ductibility of ”goodwill” associated with an acquisition is treated and whether transfer
pricing is an option.
3.1. Goodwill not deductible and transfer pricing not an option
We start with the case that goodwill associated with the acquisition is not deductible and
that foreign ﬁrms cannot make use of transfer pricing to avoid paying proﬁtt a x e si nt h e
host country. To solve the acquisition game, it will be useful to deﬁne ∆d(S) as the net
gain for ﬁrm d of selling its assets ¯ k at a selling price S:
∆d(S)= ( 1− τh)S
| {z }
Net proﬁtf r o ms a l e
− (1 − τh)(1− th)πd(d)
| {z }
Net proﬁtf r o mn os a l e
. (3.1)
From (3.1), let the reservation price of ﬁrm d be vd =m i nS, s.t ∆d(S) ≥ 0.T h a ti s ,vd
is the minimum price S at which d is willing to sell. Solving for ∆d(S)=0 ,w eh a v e :
vd =( 1− th)πd(d). (3.2)
11Note that the capital gains tax τh i nt h eh o s tc o u n t r yd o e sn o ta ﬀect ﬁrm d’s reservation
price vd, since from (3.1), the capital gains tax is levied on both the alternatives to sell
and keep the assets ¯ k, respectively.
Deriving the foreign ﬁrms’ valuations is slightly more involved. Let ∆ml(S) for l = d,m
be the net gain for an foreign ﬁrm from acquiring the domestic ﬁrm’s assets at a certain
price S:
∆ml(S)=( 1− τf)(1− th)πA(m) − S
| {z }
Net proﬁtf r o ma c q u i s i t i o n
− (1 − τf)(1− th)πG(l)
| {z }
.
Net proﬁtf r o mn o ta c q u i r i n g
(3.3)
Note that when not acquiring the domestic assets ¯ k, these would either remain in the
hands of the domestic ﬁrm (l = d), or be acquired by a rival foreign ﬁrm (l = m)
in which case the foreign ﬁrm enters Greenﬁeld. From (3.3), we can deﬁne an foreign
ﬁrm’s valuation as vml ≡ maxS, s.t ∆ml(S) ≥ 0.S o l v i n g f o r ∆ml(S)=0 , vml =
(1 − τf)(1− th)[πA(m) − πG(l)] is thus the maximum price S at which the foreign ﬁrm is
willing to buy the domestic assets. Foreign ﬁr m st h u sh a v et w ov a l u a t i o n s :T h eﬁrst is a
takeover valuation w h i c hi sa nf o r e i g nﬁrm’s value of acquiring the domestic assets when
these would otherwise remain in the hands of the domestic ﬁrm:
vmd =( 1− τf)(1− th)[πA(m) − πG(d)]. (3.4)
T h es e c o n di sapreemptive valuation,w h i c hi st h ef o r e i g nﬁrm’s value of acquiring the
domestic assets when a rival foreign ﬁrm would otherwise obtain them:
vmm =( 1− τf)(1− th)[πA(m) − πG(m)]. (3.5)
Comparing (3.4) and (3.5), note that the net proﬁtf o ri of not obtaining assets ¯ k is
diﬀerent, due to the change of identity of the ﬁrm which would otherwise obtain the
assets.
We can then use these net gains and valuations to derive the equilibrium bidding
behavior and the equilibrium ownership structures. To simplify the presentation, we make
use of the following assumption:
12Assumption 2: (i) There exists a γT > 0 deﬁned from vmd(γT,·)=vd and (ii) a γP > 0
deﬁned from vmm(γ∗,·)=vd. Then, (iii) γmax >γ P >γ T > 0 holds.
Assumption 2 ensures that all types of equilibrium ownership structures arise when
varying the complementarity, γ. We can then state the following Proposition19:
Proposition 1. Given that the complementarities between foreign ﬁrms’ ﬁrm-speciﬁc
assets and the domestic assets are: (i) suﬃciently low, γ ∈ (0,γT), no acquisition will
take place and the EOS is K(d), (ii) of intermediate size, γ ∈ [γT,γP),af o r e i g nt a k e o v e r
acquisition will take place with S∗ = vd =( 1− th)πd(d) a n dt h eE O Si sK(m),a n d
(iii) suﬃciently high, γ ∈ [γP,γmax), a foreign preemptive acquisition will take place with
S∗ = vmm =( 1− τf)(1− th)[πA(m) − πG(m)] a n dt h eE O Si sK(m).
Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 3.1. In Figures 3.1 (i) and 3.1 (ii), we derive
the equilibrium ownership structure (EOS) varying the size of the complementarities γ for
given taxes. In Figure 3.1 (iii), we explore how the EOS change when the foreign capital
gains tax τf varies.
Start with Figure 3.1(i). When complementarities are low γ ∈ (0,γT),a nf o r e i g nﬁrm’s
takeover valuation is lower than the domestic ﬁrm’s reservation price. This is illustrated in
Figure 3.1 (i) where the vd c u r v ei sa b o v et h evmd curve. In this case, the combined proﬁt
of the acquiring foreign ﬁrm and the domestic target ﬁrm is lower than their stand-alone
proﬁts. Thus, without suﬃcient eﬃciency gains for the acquirer, the associated increase
in concentration is not enough to make an acquisition proﬁtable.
A foreign acquisition will occur for suﬃciently large complementarities between foreign
ﬁrms’ assets and domestic assets. From Assumption 1, the takeover valuation, vmd =
(1 − τf)(1− th)[πA(m) − πG(d)], increases in the complementarity γ, since the expected
19 Assumption 2 ensures that foreign acquisitions at reservation price vd emerge in equilibrium,
but otherwise have no qualitative eﬀect on the results. We refer to the Appendix for a full proof




















































PE  1 −
dd






vmm  1 − f1 − thAm − Gm
vmd  1 − f1 − thAm − Gd
(i): The EOS
(given taxes)
Figure 3.1: Solving for the Equilibrium Ownership Structure (EOS).
14proﬁta sa na c q u i r e rπA(m) increases in γ, whereas the domestic ﬁrm’s valuation, vd,a n d
the foreign ﬁrm’s proﬁt as a non-acquirer πG(d) are independent of γ. Assumption 2 states
that at γ = γT, vmd = vd holds. It thus follows that a further increase in complementarities
γ will make a takeover acquisition strictly proﬁtable as vmd >v d and the equilibrium sales
price is then S∗ = vd =( 1−th)πd(d). This is illustrated at point T in Figure 3.1 (i).20 Note
that other foreign ﬁrms will not preempt a rival acquisition in this region, since a rival
ﬁrm is better oﬀ as a non-acquirer due to the beneﬁt from a more concentrated market,
as shown by vd >v mm.21
Finally, turn to the case with high levels of complementarity between foreign ﬁrms’
assets and domestic assets γ ∈ [γP,γmax). Using Assumption 1, we can note that an
foreign ﬁrm’s preemptive valuation vmm will increase more than the takeover valuation
vmd since increasing complementarities do not only increase the product market proﬁta s
an acquirer but also decrease t h ep r o d u c tm a r k e tp r o ﬁt as a non-acquirer:
dvmm
dγ






















Thus, the preemptive valuation vmm is not only driven by the beneﬁts of obtaining a
strong position in the product market as an acquirer, but also by the preemptive motive
for avoiding a weak position as a non-acquirer. Assumption 2 states that at γ = γP,
vmm = vd. From (3.6), it then follows that a further increase in complementarities into the
region γ ∈ (γP,γmax) will make a preemptive acquisition strictly proﬁtable as vmm >v d.
Fierce bidding competition among foreign ﬁrms then drives the equilibrium sales price to
S∗ = vmm =( 1− τf)(1− th)[πA(m) − πG(m)]. This is illustrated by point P in Figure
3.1 (i).22. This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
20From (3.1) and (3.3), it follows that ∆d(vd)=0and ∆md(vd) > 0 for γ ∈ [γT,γP).
21From (3.3), it follows that ∆mm(vd) < 0 for γ ∈ [γT,γP).
22 From (3.3), it follows that ∆mm(vd) > 0 for γ ∈ [γP,γmax). At S∗ = vmm, ∆mm(vmm)=0 .
15Let us now explore how changes in foreign corporate taxation inﬂuence the equilibrium
ownership structure. Note from Figure 3.1 (i) that a takeover acquisition is just proﬁtable
at point T, where vmd = vd holds. From (3.2) and (3.4), we can then solve for the level of







We label this condition the takeover condition (TO-condition), τTO
f (γ).
In the same vein, we can deﬁne the preemption condition (PE-condition)τP
f (γ) as the







The takeover condition τTO
f (γ) and the preemption condition τPE
f (γ) are illustrated in Fig-
ure 3.1(iii). Note that points T and P indicate where takeover acquisitions and preemptive
acquisitions occur for a given level of foreign capital gains taxation ˜ τf, derived from Figure
3.1(i). The locus associated with takeover condition τTO
f (γ) and the preemption condition
τPE
f (γ) is then upward-sloping in the γ−τf space. Intuitively, at higher complementarities
γ, a higher foreign capital gains taxation τf is needed to balance the foreign ﬁrm’s higher
value of obtaining the domestic assets (i.e. to preserve vml = vd for l = d,m). The locus for
the takeover condition τTO
f (γ) is above the locus of the preemption condition τPO
f (γ) if and
only if the complementarities are not too large.23 The equilibrium ownership structure
involves domestic ownership north-east of the takeover locus τTO
f (γ), indicated as K(d).
Preemptive acquisitions occur southwest of the preemption locus τPO
f (γ), as is indicated
by K(m) and S∗ = vmm. Finally, takeover acquisitions occur for combinations of γ and τf
between the takeover locus τTO
f (γ) and the preemption locus τPO
f (γ),i n d i c a t e da sK(m)
and S∗ = vd.
Inspecting Figure 3.1(iii), we can make the following observations:
23 At point C in Figure 3.1 (i) vmd = vmm. It then follows that τTO
f (γ)=τPE
f (γ) at point C
in Figure 3.1 (iii).
16(i) There is no eﬀect of taxes levied in the host country on the equilibrium ownership
structure: The domestic capital gains tax τh is neutral to the decision of whether to
sell, since as noted from (3.1), the reward for selling/not selling is taxed symmetrically.
Moreover, since the domestic proﬁtt a xth is paid by all ﬁrms, it has a symmetric eﬀect
on foreign ﬁrms’ valuations and the domestic ﬁrm’s reservation price and hence, does not
aﬀect the equilibrium ownership of the domestic assets ¯ k.
(ii) For a given level of the complementarity γ,ar e d u c t i o no fτf can induce foreign
acquisitions, since a lower tax for foreign share holders increases foreign ﬁrms’ valuations
of the domestic assets from (3.4) and (3.5). At low level of complementarities, reductions
in taxes may even trigger ineﬃcient foreign acquisitions where γ<1. This can be seen
from a vertical movement from Region I to Region III in 3.1(iii). The driving force behind
these ineﬃcient acquisitions is the increase in concentration resulting from the acquisition,
which becomes less costly to achieve at lower taxation.
(iii) If the complementarity between foreign and domestic assets is suﬃciently high,
reduced foreign capital gains tax τf c a nl e a dt oeﬃcient foreign acquisitions where γ>1.
Intuitively, at lower taxation, eﬃcient foreign acquisitions also become less costly as the
tax burden is reduced. Thus, lower foreign capital gains taxes can trigger eﬃcient foreign
acquisitions, which can be seen from a vertical movement from Region II to Region IV in
3.1(iii).
Thus, we can state the following proposition:
Proposition 2. If goodwill is not deductible and transfer pricing is not possible, then
(i) if the complementarity between foreign and domestic assets is suﬃciently low, reduced
foreign capital gains tax can lead to ineﬃcient foreign acquisitions, and (ii) if the comple-
mentarity between foreign and domestic assets is suﬃciently high, reduced foreign capital
gains tax can lead to eﬃcient foreign acquisitions.





































TO  1 −
1−thdd
1−tfAm−Gd f










Figure 3.2: The Equilibrium ownership structure under transfer pricing.
Cournot Model described in the Appendix.24
3.2. Goodwill not deductible and transfer pricing is an option
It is well known that foreign ﬁrms can reduce their overall tax burden by shifting proﬁts
toward low-tax countries, for example by using transfer pricing techniques. Indeed, Bar-
telsman and Beetsma (2000) ﬁnd evidence of tax diﬀerences having a signiﬁcant impact
on where incomes are declared.25 To capture this, we assume that a foreign owner can use
transfer pricing to transfer all proﬁts to a foreign tax haven, where a foreign proﬁtt a x ,
tf <t h, is paid. As discussed in Section 2, such transfer pricing is assumed to be risk free
and costless.
24 Proofs are available upon request.
25 See also references in World Investment Report (WIR) 1998.
18To see how results change under transfer pricing, we need only substitute the foreign
proﬁtt a xtf for the home proﬁtt a xth into the expressions for foreign ﬁrms’ valuations
(3.4) and (3.5), and thus vml =( 1− τf)(1− tf)[πA(m) − πG(l)] for l = d,m.S i n c eﬁrm
d’s reservation price remains unchanged at vd =( 1 − th)πd(d), the takeover condition









(1−tf)[πA(m)−πG(m)].( 3 . 9 )
Comparing (3.9) with (3.7) and (3.8), it follows that both the takeover locus τTO
f (γ) and
the preemption locus τPE
f (γ) will shift to the left in Figure 3.1, due to transfer pricing
since tf <t h implies that
(1−th)
(1−tf) < 1. This is illustrated in Figure 3.2. Note that points
T’ and P’ indicate that takeover acquisitions and preemptive acquisitions occur at lower
complementarities under transfer pricing, since γT0 <γ T and γP0 <γ P.I n t u i t i v e l y ,a st a x
evasion occurs through the transfers of proﬁts to a tax haven, complementarities need to
be smaller to balance the foreign ﬁrms’ higher value of obtaining the domestic assets (i.e.
to preserve vml = vd for l = d,m) . A sc a nb es e e ni nF i g u r e3 . 2 ,t h i si n c r e a s e sR e g i o n
III where ineﬃcient foreign acquisitions occur, while reducing Region II where ineﬃcient
domestic ownership prevails.
We have the following proposition:
Proposition 3. If goodwill is not deductible and transfer pricing is possible, then (i) if the
complementarity between foreign and domestic assets is suﬃciently low, reduced foreign
capital gains tax and reduced foreign proﬁt tax can lead to ineﬃcient foreign acquisitions,
and (ii) if the complementarity between foreign and domestic assets is suﬃciently high,
reduced foreign capital gains tax and reduced foreign proﬁt tax can lead to eﬃcient foreign
acquisitions.
193.3. Goodwill deductible
The deductibility of ”goodwill” associated with an acquisition, i.e. the part of the ac-
quisition price above the value of deductible assets in the acquired ﬁrm, varies between
countries and is open to diﬀerent plausible interpretations. The previous section took the
assumption of not allowing goodwill to be deductible. How will the results change if this
assumption is relaxed? To explore this, ﬁrst assume that transfer pricing is not possible
and hence, foreign ﬁr m sp a yd o m e s t i cp r o ﬁts taxes th. Assume that goodwill can be de-
ducted when capital gains taxes are to be paid, but not when proﬁt taxes are to be paid.
To derive foreign ﬁrm valuations, a foreign ﬁrms’ net gain from buying ﬁrm d’s assets is:
∆ml(S)=( 1− τf)[(1− th)πA(m) − S] − S
| {z }
Net proﬁtf r o ma c q u i s i t i o n
− (1 − τf)(1− th)πG(l)
| {z }
,
Net proﬁt from greenﬁeld entry
where l = d,m indicating the alternative ownership of assets ¯ k when an foreign ﬁrm does
not obtain these assets and enters greenﬁeld. Once more, deﬁne the foreign ﬁrm’s valuation
as vml ≡ maxS, s.t ∆ml(S) ≥ 0.S o l v i n gf o r∆ml(S)=0 , foreign ﬁrms’ valuations vml are
thus vmd =( 1− th)[πA(m) − πG(d)], which is the value of an acquisition given that ﬁrm
d will not otherwise sell, and vmm =( 1− th)[πA(m) − πG(m)], which is the value of an
acquisition, given that a rival foreign ﬁrm will otherwise obtains ﬁrm d’s assets. Note that
since ﬁrm d’s reservation price does not change and thus remains at vd =( 1− th)πd(d),
it follows that taxes are completely neutral in this case.
Thus, we can state the following proposition:
Proposition 4. If goodwill is deductible and transfer pricing is not an option, foreign
corporate taxes will not aﬀect the pattern of foreign acquisitions.
Under transfer pricing, foreign ﬁrms’ valuations become vml =( 1− tf)[πA(m) − πG(l)]
for l = d,m, while the domestic owner’s reservation price is vd =( 1− th)πd(d).U s i n gt h e
same method as above, we can state the following proposition:
20Proposition 5. If goodwill is deductible and transfer pricing is possible, then (i) if the
complementarity between foreign and domestic assets is suﬃciently low, reduced foreign
proﬁt tax can lead to ineﬃcient foreign acquisitions, and (ii) if the complementarity be-
tween foreign and domestic assets is suﬃciently high, reduced foreign proﬁtt a xc a nl e a d
to eﬃcient foreign acquisitions.
4. Tax revenues
In the introduction, we noted that capital gains tax revenues could potentially be sub-
stantially increased when a foreign acquisition occurs, as illustrated by the example of
Ford’s acquisition of Volvo in Figure 1.1. In this section, it is shown that a foreign acqui-
sition can indeed increase tax revenues when the complementarities between foreign and
domestic assets are high, and that there is a fundamental diﬀerence between foreign direct
investment in scarce and non-scarce assets concerning the eﬀects on tax revenues.
To this end, add a stage zero to the game where the government chooses among three
types of policies towards FDI, considering the impact on tax revenues. Under a restric-
tive (R) policy, FDI is not allowed, and the domestic monopoly remains intact. Denote
the associated ownership structure K(dmon)26.U n d e r a discriminatory (D) policy, only
greenﬁeld FDI is allowed. The associated ownership structure is then K(d),w h e r eﬁrm d
keeps its assets and all foreign ﬁrms enter greenﬁeld. Finally, under a liberal (L) policy,
both greenﬁeld and acquisition FDI are allowed and hence, in addition to the ownership
structures K(d), the ownership structure K(m) may arise, where the domestic owner sells
its assets in stage 1 to one of the foreign ﬁrms and remaining foreign ﬁrms enter green-
ﬁeld. Note that while our discussion here assumes that government policy shapes the FDI
pattern, we could also interpret these policies as situations where only certain types of
entry modes are available. For instance, in some industries, no valuable targets might be
present and greenﬁeld entry might be the only possible way of entering. An alternative
26 K(dmon)=( ¯ k + κ∗
d,0,...,0). In this case, the domestic ﬁrm retains its monopoly and holds
assets ¯ k + κ∗
d.
21interpretation is thus that nature chooses the type of industry in stage zero.
To proceed, we assume that foreign ﬁr m sc a n n o td e d u c tg o o d w i l lw h i l et r a n s f e rp r i c i n g
is possible, i.e. we base the analysis on the case studied in Section 3.2. This enables us
to illustrate the main mechanisms in a convenient way. In particular, it enables us to
abstract from tax payments by greenﬁeld entrants to focus on the direct eﬀect of the
foreign acquisition on domestic tax revenues. We discuss the eﬀects on tax revenues of
diﬀerent treatments of goodwill deductions and transfer pricing in the end of the ensuing
sections.
4.1. Tax revenues and entry mode
Let us ﬁrst compare the collected tax revenues when only greenﬁeld takes place under
the D-policy with the collected taxes when no FDI takes place under the R-policy. Tax
revenues under the R-policy are simply those from taxing the monopoly twice. This
tax revenue is TR =[ th + τh(1 − th)]πd(dmon). Tax revenues under the D-policy are
TD =[ th + τh(1 − th)]πd(d),s i n c eπd(d) is the domestic ﬁrm’s proﬁt under greenﬁeld
e n t r yb yf o r e i g nﬁrms and since foreign ﬁr m sf u l l ye v a d et a x e si nt h eh o s tc o u n t r y .T h e
tax revenues TR and TD are illustrated as horizontal lines in Figure 4.1 (iii) since from










where we make the assumption that the loss of monopoly power reduces ﬁrm d’s product
market proﬁt, πd(d) <π d(dmon).
Consequently, we have derived the following result:
Lemma 1. If goodwill is not deductible, foreign ﬁrms can use transferp r i c i n ga n di f
foreign ﬁrms only enter greenﬁeld, tax revenues will be lower than if the domestic monopoly
remained, i.e. TR >T D.
22Intuitively, when FDI only takes place through greenﬁeld entry, tax revenues are re-
duced from FDI since the foreign entrants evade taxes and the domestic ﬁrm’s taxable
proﬁt is reduced.
Let us now also consider the L-policy where also a foreign acquisition takes place. In
Figures 4.1 (i) and 4.1 (ii), we derive the equilibrium ownership structure (EOS) varying
the size of the complementarities γ. Under transfer pricing, note that takeover acquisitions
becomes proﬁtable at T’, whereas preemptive acquisitions are proﬁt a b l ea tP ’ .H e n c e ,f o r
low complementarities γ ∈ (0,γT0), no acquisition takes place, and tax revenues are hence
identical under the L- and D-policies. When γ ∈ [γT0,γP0), a takeover acquisitions occurs
and the acquisition price is S∗ = vd =( 1− th)πd(d). The corresponding tax revenues are
thus TL = τhvd = τh(1 − th)πd(d). As illustrated in Figure 4.1 (iii), in this interval, the
L-policy may not only induce ineﬃcient acquisitions (for which γ<1), it also generates
the lowest tax revenues since the foreign acquirer uses transfer pricing to avoid paying
proﬁt taxes in the host country, which is illustrated by the downward shift in the TL curve
in Figure 4.1 (iii) at γT.
However, at high complementarities γ ∈ [γP0,γmax), a preemptive acquisition will occur
and the acquisition price is driven up to S∗ = vmm =( 1− τf)(1− tf)[πA(m) − πG(m)].
The corresponding tax revenues in this case are TL = τhvmm. In contrast, in this interval,
tax revenues may be maximized by allowing for foreign acquisition under the L-policy
since the sales price might and the corresponding capital gains tax revenues might then
b es ol a r g et oc o m p e n s a t ef o rt h el o s so fd o u b l et a x a t i o no ft h ed o m e s t i cm o n o p o l yp r o ﬁt
πd(dmon). This is illustrated by the upward slope of the TL curve in Figure 4.1 (iii) at γP0
and the TL curve being above the TR curve at γ>ˆ γ
LR.
We have thus derived the following result:
Proposition 6. (i) When a takeover acquisition occurs for medium complementarities
γ ∈ [γT0,γmax], the L-policy allowing both acquisitions and greenﬁeld FDI leads to the
lowest tax revenues, TR >T D >T L.(ii) When a preemptive acquisition occurs for suﬃ-
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Complementarity, 










(i): Solving the 




























vmm  1 − f1 − tfAm − Gm
vmd  1 − f1 − tfAm − Gd
th  h1 − thddmon
th  h1 − thdd
hvd
Figure 4.1: Tax revenues and government policy under transfer pricing.
24ciently high complementarities γ>ˆ γ
LR ≥ γP0, the L-policy allowing both acquisition and
greenﬁeld FDI, leads to the highest tax revenues, TL >T R >T D.
The proposition illustrates that foreign acquisitions may indeed reduce tax revenues
when foreign ﬁrms evade taxes. However, given that the target’s complementarities and ef-
ﬁciency gains are suﬃciently large, the proposition also illustrates that allowing both types
of entry might generate higher tax revenues than restricting foreign entry, despite the tax
evasion by the foreign ﬁrms. Due to ﬁerce bidding competition between the foreign ﬁrms
over highly complementary domestic assets, all beneﬁts from the acquisition — including
the evaded taxes — are then competed away and accrue to the domestic seller. Hence,
by taxing the increased capital gains of the selling domestic owner, the lost proﬁtt a x e s
are compensated, and if the increase in capital gains for the domestic seller is suﬃciently
large, the tax revenues will be higher when the acquisition takes place.
How would the results then change if goodwill is deductible and transfer pricing is
not an option? More generally, when preemptive acquisitions occur for suﬃciently high
synergies, the bidding competition over strategically valuable assets will lead to increased
taxable capital gains from the domestic seller. Indeed, this holds regardless of the tax
system as long as the host country taxes domestic shareholders. In particular, maintaining
the assumption of no goodwill deduction while relaxing the assumption of transfer pricing,
will strengthen the result that tax revenues can increase from allowing foreign acquisitions.
This follows from the fact that a foreign acquisition will in this environment take place
if and only if aggregate industry proﬁt increases, which in turn implies that aggregate
taxable proﬁts will increase under the L-policy. Proof of these statements based on the
Linear Quadratic model is available upon request.
4.2. Tax revenues and tax competition
Let us also illustrate the eﬀects of tax competition on tax revenues maintaining the assump-
tion of transfer pricing. To this end, consider the case where γ ∈ [γP0,γmax),a n dap r e e m p -
25tive acquisition occurs at an acquisition price S∗ = vmm =( 1 −τf)(1− tf)[πA(m) − πG(m)].





dτf = −τh (1 − tf)[πA(m) − πG(m)] < 0
dT L
dtf = −τh (1 − τf)[πA(m) − πG(m)] < 0
. (4.2)
Thus, we have derived the following proposition:
Proposition 7. If goodwill is not deductible and transfer pricing is possible, then a host
country’s tax revenues might increase when another country reduces its capital gains tax
and/or proﬁt tax, since the acquisition price of its domestic target ﬁrms increases and
thus, also the tax revenues.
Moreover, it directly follows that as long goodwill is not deductible, reduced foreign
capital taxes can increase domestic tax revenues independent of whether transfer pricing
is an option. As long as transfer pricing is an option, reduced foreign proﬁtt a x e sc a n
increase domestic tax revenues independent of whether deduction of goodwill is an option.
On a ﬁnal note, we have assumed that no re-location of production takes place from
country H under tax competition. Even when relaxing this assumption, it is true that
tax revenues may increase from an acquisition. To see this, assume that foreign ﬁrms will
serve the market in country H from the foreign tax haven (or from another location with
low production costs and access to low taxes). Then, note that the acquisition price is still
S∗ = vmm =( 1− τf)(1− tf)[πA(m) − πG(m)]. Thus, if the services of assets ¯ k can be
relocated27 and complementarities are large, tax revenues from capital gains taxes from
a foreign acquisition may still be sizable even if the foreign acquirer moves production
outside of country H.28
27 The assets ¯ k could, for instance, be a trade market or a well-known product, or a unique
technology.
28 T h er e s u l t sd e r i v e dh e r ew o u l db ea l s ov a l i di nas e t t i n gw h e r eﬁrm d and the M foreign
ﬁrms would be active on a world market.I ns u c has e t t i n g ,ﬁrm d would have the decision to sell
to one of the foreign competitors, or remain as an independent competitor. This setting would
correspond more closely to the acquisition of the Swedish car producer Volvo, discussed in the
introduction, for which the majority of customers are located outside Sweden.
265. Concluding remarks
We ﬁnd that reduced foreign corporate taxes can lead to ineﬃcient foreign acquisition
if complementarities between foreign and domestic assets are low and to eﬃcient foreign
acquisitions if such complementarities are high. Reduced foreign taxes can then stimu-
late a domestic industry if combined with a well functioning merger law blocking foreign
acquisitions mainly driven by market power.
Further, it is well known that foreign entry by foreign ﬁrms may lead to rent shifts from
domestic to foreign owners which, in turn, may reduce the tax revenues for the domestic
country. However, it is shown in this paper that if foreign entry takes place through the
acquisition of suﬃciently scarce domestic assets, domestic tax revenues can increase. The
reason is that in the bidding competition between the foreign ﬁrms over the scarce domestic
assets, the beneﬁts from the acquisition, including tax advantages and evaded taxes, are
competed away and captured by the domestic seller which, in turn, pays capital gains
tax on the proceeds. Consequently, the paper suggests that one important measure for
mitigating the eﬀects of tax evasion by foreign ﬁr m si st oe n s u r et h a tt h e r ei sc o m p e t i t i o n
between foreign ﬁrms to enter the domestic market. Otherwise, a dominating foreign
entrant may use its bargaining power to enter the domestic market, without creating rents
for domestic scarce sector-speciﬁc assets. An implication for tax authorities is then that
the monitoring of capital gains acts as a substitute for the monitoring of proﬁts h i f t i n g
activities.
This paper demonstrates that some aspects of foreign acquisitions can be more com-
plex than commonly perceived. Our results show that quite technical issues in the tax
code, such as the treatment of goodwill deductibility, can have important eﬀects on the
pattern of foreign acquisitions, productive eﬃciency and tax revenues. It therefore seems
reasonable to take into account these aspects of the corporate tax code in the recent eﬀorts
to harmonize various aspects of European takeover regulation.29
29See e.g. Berglöf and Burkart (2003).
27There are several interesting avenues for future research. Endogenizing taxes in this
framework would probably lead to new interesting results on tax competition, among other
things. Studying the long run eﬀects on the investment pattern in this environment seems
also fruitful. An interesting empirical challenge would be to investigate how responsive
asset prices are to diﬀerences in tax rates (and levels of enforcement of these taxes) across
countries.
A. Appendix:
Here, we derive the EOS relaxing Assumption A2 in the text. The EOS is shown in table
A.1 and proved below.
Table A.1: The equilibrium ownership structure and the acquisition price under the L-
policy.
Ineq: Deﬁnition: Ownership Acquisition
structure: price S:
I1: vmm >v md >v d K(m) vmm
I2: vmm >v d >v md K(m) or K(d) vmm
I3: vmd >v mm >v d K(m) vmm
I4: vmd >v d >v mm K(m) vd
I5: vd >v mm >v md K(d) .
I6: vd >v md >v mm K(d) .
A.1. Proof of Table A.1
First, note that bi ≥ maxvml,l= {d,m} is a weakly dominated strategy, since no foreign
ﬁrm will post a bid equal to or above its maximum valuation of obtaining the assets, and
28that ﬁrm d will accept a bid in stage 2, iﬀ bi >v d.
Inequality I1 Consider the equilibrium candidate b∗ =( b∗
1,b ∗
2,...,yes). Let us assume
that foreign ﬁrm w 6= d is the foreign ﬁrm that has posted the highest bid and obtains the
assets and ﬁrm s 6= d the foreign ﬁrm with the second highest bid.
Then, b∗
w ≥ vmm is a weakly dominated strategy. b∗
w <v mm − ε is not an equilibrium,
since ﬁrm j 6= w,d then beneﬁts from deviating to bj = b∗
w+ε, since it will then obtain the
assets and pay a price lower than its valuation of obtaining them. If b∗
w = vmm − ε,a n d
b∗
s ∈ [vmm − ε,vmm − 2ε], then no foreign ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate. By deviating
to no, ﬁrm d’s payoﬀ decreases since it foregoes a selling price exceeding its valuation, vd.
Accordingly, ﬁrm d has no incentive to deviate and thus, b∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Let b =( b1,,,b m,no) be a Nash equilibrium. Let foreign ﬁrm h be the foreign ﬁrm
with the highest bid. Firm d will then say no iﬀ bh ≤ vd.B u tf o r e i g nﬁrm j 6= d will have
the incentive to deviate to b0 = vd + ε in period 1, since vmd >v d. This contradicts the
assumption that b is a Nash equilibrium.
Inequality I2 Consider the equilibrium candidate b∗ =( b∗
1,b ∗
2,...,y).T h e n ,b∗
w ≥ vij is
a weakly dominated strategy. b∗
w <v ij − ε is not an equilibrium since ﬁrm j 6= w,d then
beneﬁts from deviating to bj = b∗
w +ε, since it will then obtain the assets and pay a price
lower than its valuation of obtaining them. If b∗
w = vmm −ε,a n db∗
s ∈ [vmm −ε,vmm −2ε],
then no foreign ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate. By deviating to no, ﬁrm d’s payoﬀ
decreases since it foregoes a selling price exceeding its valuation, vd. Accordingly, ﬁrm d
has no incentive to deviate and thus, b∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Consider the equilibrium candidate b∗∗ =( b∗∗
1 ,b ∗∗
2 ,...,no). Then, b∗
w ≥ vmd is not an
equilibrium, since ﬁrm d would then beneﬁt by deviating to yes.I f b∗
w ≤ vd,t h e nn o
foreign ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate. By deviating to yes, ﬁrm d’s payoﬀ decreases,
since it then sells its assets at a price below its valuation, vd.F i r md has no incentive to
deviate and thus, b∗∗ is a Nash equilibrium.




is a weakly dominated strategy. b∗
w <v mm−ε is not an equilibrium, since ﬁrm j 6= w,d then
beneﬁts from deviating to bj = b∗
w +ε, since it will then obtain the assets and pay a price
lower than its valuation of obtaining them. If b∗
w = vmm −ε,a n db∗
s ∈ [vmm −ε,vmm −2ε],
then no foreign ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate. By deviating to no, ﬁrm d’s payoﬀ
decreases, since it foregoes a selling price exceeding its valuation, vd. Accordingly, ﬁrm d
has no incentive to deviate and thus, b∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Let b =( b1,...,b M,no) be a Nash equilibrium. Firm d will then say no iﬀ bh ≤ vd.B u t
foreign ﬁrm j 6= d will then have the incentive to deviate to b0 = vd + ε in stage 1, since
vmd >v d. This contradicts the assumption that b is a Nash equilibrium.




is not an equilibrium since ﬁrm w would then beneﬁt from deviating to bw = vd. b∗
w <v d
is not an equilibrium, since ﬁrm d would then not accept any bid. If b∗
w = vd−ε,t h e nﬁrm
w has no incentive to deviate. By deviating to b0
j ≤ b∗
w, ﬁrm j’s, j 6= w,d,p a y o ﬀ does not
change. By deviating to b0
j >b ∗
w, ﬁrm j’s payoﬀ decreases since it must pay a price above
its willingness to pay vmm. Accordingly, ﬁrm j has no incentive to deviate. By deviating
to no, ﬁrm d’s payoﬀ decreases since it foregoes a selling price above its valuation vd.
Accordingly, ﬁrm d has no incentive to deviate and thus, b∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Let b =( b1,,,b m,yes) be a Nash equilibrium. If bw ≥ vmm,t h e nﬁrm w will have the
incentive to deviate to b0 = bw − ε.I f bw <v mm,t h e nﬁrm d will have the incentive to
deviate to no, which contradicts the assumption that b is a Nash equilibrium.
Let b =( b1,...,bm,no) be a Nash equilibrium. Firm d will then say no iﬀ bh ≤ vd.
But foreign ﬁrm j 6= d will have the incentive to deviate to b0 = vd + ε in stage 1 since
vmd >v d, which contradicts the assumption that b is a Nash equilibrium.




i <v d ∀i ∈ M. It then follows directly that no ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate and thus,
30b∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Then, note that ﬁrm d will accept a bid iﬀ bi ≥ vd. But bi ≥ vd is a weakly dominating
bid in these intervals, since vd > max{vmm,v md}. Thus, the assets will not be sold in these
intervals.
B. The linear quadratic Cournot model
Let the oligopoly interaction in period three be described by Cournot competition in
homogenous goods. The proﬁtf o rﬁrm i can be written (omitting function arguments
on the right-hand side) (1 − τr)(1− tr)πi(q,κ,l)=( 1 − τr)(1− tr)
h






where we assume costs to be quadratic in new assets, κi, which we henceforth refer to as
new capital. Investments in new capital in stage 2 reduce a ﬁrm’s marginal cost in a linear
fashion, ci =¯ ci − θκi, where θ is a positive constant 30
Making a distinction between ﬁrm types, we also have:
¯ cG = c, ¯ cA = c − γ¯ k, ¯ cd = c − ¯ k. (B.1)
Hence, we assume existing assets ¯ k and new assets κi to be imperfect substitutes. An
acquisition of ¯ k may, as discussed in section 2.2, provide knowledge of the market, or
provide access to an existing distribution network, thereby providing assets distinct from
new investments κi, which provide a capacity to produce. This is modelled by assuming
that gaining possession of the domestic assets ¯ k i ns t a g eo n ea l t e r st h ei n t e r c e p tt e r m¯ ci
in (B.1). Note also that the complementarity parameter γ in (B.1) shows the eﬀect of
adding foreign ﬁrms’ ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets to domestic assets ¯ k. Let the inverse demand in
30 For simplicity, we assume all ﬁrms to share the same investment technology, θ and µ.
Asymmetries between ﬁrms are captured by the intercept term, ¯ ci, which measures the impact
on ﬁrm i’s absolute eﬃciency level of the possession of all other assets (such as ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets
or acquired assets) prior to investment in new assets, κi, in stage 2. Assuming that asymmetries
between ﬁrms enter through the intercept term ¯ ci in the marginal cost ci =¯ ci−θκi simpliﬁes the
calculations. Alternatively, we could assume that ﬁrms diﬀer in their investment costs for new
investments (µi), or in how eﬃciently marginal costs can be reduced by new investments (θi).
Qualitatively, this yields similar results.
31the product market be given by P = a− 1
s
PN
i=1 qi, where a>0 is a demand parameter, s
m a yb ei n t e r p r e t e da st h es i z eo ft h em a r k e t ,N is the total number of ﬁrms on the market,
i.e. N(m)=M, N(d)=M +1 , N(dmon)=1and qi is the quantity supplied by ﬁrm i.
The game is solved backwards.
In period three, ﬁrm i maximizes the net proﬁts (1 − τr)(1− tr)πi(x,κ,l).( 2 . 1 )t h e n
take the form
∂πi(κ,l)
∂qi = P − ci − qi =0 , where we note that taxes are not distortionary.
In period two, ﬁrm i invests in new capital, κi, taking the optimal quantities q∗(κ,l) into











dκi =0 , where again taxes are not distortionary and where it





N+1.31 We can then
solve the Nash equilibrium in new investments κ∗(l) and its associated Nash equilibrium
in quantities q∗(l), and then form the reduced-form proﬁts for each type of ﬁrm πh(l), h =








ﬁne Φ(l)=( 1+N(l) − 2N(l)η)(1+2N(l)+N(l)2 − 2N(l)η), Ω(l)=Λ(1 + N(l) − 2N(l)η)










Φ(d) and, ﬁnally, q∗
G(d)=
s(N(d)+1)[Ω(d)+¯ cd(N(d)+1)]
Φ(d) . Finally, the reduced form proﬁts net of taxes (1 − τr)(1− tr)πh(l)
can be inserted into valuations vmm, vmd and the domestic ﬁrm’s reservation price vd to
solve the acquisition game in stage 1, and determine the equilibrium ownership structure,
K(l) for the speciﬁc assumptions made on the tax system.
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